KHAMENEI SURVIVED, BUT HE SHOULDN’T HAVE: WHY ISRAEL’S IRAN CAMPAIGN REMAINS INCOMPLETE

Shock and Awe, as the initial US strikes of the Second Iraq War in 2003 came to be known, was tame in comparison.

The State of Israel’s massive opening attack against Iran, last month, combining a wide range of conventional and clandestine means, shocked the world. It was unparalleled and unprecedented in the history of warfare.

Within hours, Jerusalem had decapitated Iran’s various military and intelligence apparatuses and eliminated key figures in the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. Within only a few days, Israel rendered both the Natanz and Isfahan nuclear sites inoperable and destroyed other sites and materials crucial to the Islamic Republic’s wider nuclear program. The IDF quickly achieved air superiority over Iran in the process.

This aerial dominance allowed the IDF to target and destroy vast amounts of various Iranian weaponry and significant portions of its defense industry.

Israel was on course for yet another astounding and earth-shattering feat, destined for a place of honor in its already hallowed history. Yet, the historic accomplishment was blunted by two mistakes, one severe and one more easily rectified.

The severe mistake occurred on June 22 when Israel allowed the United States to take part in direct strikes on Iran.

The US action, though very narrow and limited, upended both Israel’s pristine record of going it alone when conducting warfare and resulted in an arguably less effective and less thorough neutralization of the crown jewel of Iran’s nuclear program, the Fordow facility.

Israel's deterrence is based on the principle it will defend itself by itself

ISRAEL’S DETERRENCE, and in practical terms its very survival, are based on the fundamental principle that the country will defend itself by itself and against any enemy or group of enemies. The only time that foreign forces ever took a direct and offensive role in a war that Israel was involved in was during the 1956 Sinai Campaign. France and Britain pre-planned with Israel to take part in that conflict, separately but in parallel. The European nations sought to seize the Suez Canal, while Israel would conquer the Sinai Peninsula.

The crucial difference between 1956 and the US taking a limited but very high-profile action in Israel’s Iran campaign is that the British and the French acted separately from Israeli forces geographically and operationally, and toward a different objective.  

The British and French also failed in their objective, only serving to magnify Israel’s major success in quickly and fully defeating the Egyptians in the Sinai and taking control of it.

As for the US strike in Iran, there are increasingly more questions about just how effective the American airstrike was at Fordow. There have been recent reports of intercepted phone conversations between Iranian officials who voiced relieved surprise at the limited efficacy of the US strike.

In the short term at least, the consequence of Israel allowing a foreign power to act – even if narrowly – in its place has degraded its deterrent power, regardless of whether that foreign power’s action was particularly effective or not.

This is especially true given that Fordow is seen as the most fortified and coveted of Iran’s nuclear sites. Moreover, to give the impression of a more comprehensive US effort, the American military also launched ordnance at the Natanz and Isfahan sites, which were rendered inoperable by Israel beforehand, according to reports of a certain level of radioactive contamination at the site of Natanz after IDF strikes.

It was divulged before, during, and after Israel’s campaign in Iran [by IDF and government officials] that Jerusalem, of course, had operational plans to deal with Fordow.  In fact, it seems that a portion of the assets that were to be involved in those plans were activated, not to execute their original task of neutralizing Fordow, but to check the results of the US Air Force’s B-2 strike on the facility.

Reports of Israeli strikes cutting off access routes to Fordow, and President Donald Trump’s offhand statement about Israeli personnel on the ground checking the site as part of the battle damage assessment process, provide a glimpse of just some of what Israel’s original blue-and-white plans for taking out Fordow were.

AS FOR the United States, the converse is true. Taking part in the campaign provides a huge dividend to the current administration in Washington, while creating an erroneous and unfortunate basis for Israel’s current and future enemies to question if it is still the Israel of years past-willing, ready, and able to defend itself alone no matter what the circumstances, which it most certainly is.  

President Trump, being a master of promotion, is understandably trying to maximize positive public messaging on the US action in Iran. Action that the State of Israel teed up for him, minimizing almost to zero the risk to American aircraft.

The Trump administration seeks to strengthen US deterrence, particularly after very limited military success against the Houthis, as well as the past failures of Iraq and Afghanistan. And, of course, to solidify the president’s own image.

The US president has encountered difficulties in this PR effort, though, with the Trump-phobic and biased mainstream media not playing along so easily – in addition to what appear to be the less-than-ideal results of the American strike at Fordow.

Returning to Israel’s second, more easily rectifiable mistake, Israeli forces did not eliminate Ali Khamenei and his son Mojtaba, a potential successor, during their multi-day campaign in Iran.

Tehran is driven by a fanatical and apocalyptic ideology that views its nuclear ambitions as a divinely mandated tool in the service of an “end times” destruction of Israel, and the establishment of a neo-Persian Islamist empire.  

It is therefore crucial, if not to cause the fall of the regime, to at least severely neuter it in the near term. Eliminating Khamenei and his most likely successor/s would have aided greatly in that goal.

With the role of ayatollah serving almost as a representative of Allah and the Prophet Muhammad, taking out Khamenei would also symbolize a metaphysical defeat, something that carries great significance in Middle Eastern consciousness.

Given the two missteps Israel made in what was otherwise a golden moment of historic triumph, there is a sense that the job, as it were, is not done, and that we are only three-fourths or so of the way to the finish line.  

With Yemen still an open front and Iran seemingly willing and able to salvage parts of its nuclear program, the State of Israel has ample opportunity and the fundamental need to correct these two missteps. It just might be that what we actually witnessed in June 2025 was just the first Israel-Iran War.

The writer is an Israeli hi-tech entrepreneur and a member of the Israel Leadership Forum. He is involved with various Israel advocacy causes, including working with Christian Zionists as well as pro-Israel Noahide groups.

2025-07-05T21:40:58Z